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Abstract
We develop an optimizing model of a farm that is subject to invasion by an infectious
disease such as bird flu, where the probability of invasion depends on the degree of free-
ranging on the farm and post-invasion rate of spread on the farm depends on the farm size,
the farmer’s surveillance efforts, and the degree of free-ranging. We examine optimal policies
for the farm and for the government, and analyze how these policies are affected by the degree
of free-ranging. We find, inter alia, that when the farm size is endogenous fining an infected
farm is superior as an instrument than providing it a rebate on costs, but when the farm
size is exogenous the two instruments are equivalent. We also find that optimal surveillance
effort, farm size, and fines are smaller for free-range farms when costs are sensitive to the
degree of free-ranging.
JEL Classification: Q12, Q18, I18, H32
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1 Introduction
With the increasing number of animal infections (OIE, 2008a) and recent cases of human
infections (WHO, 2008) from highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) virus, increased atten-
tion is being focused on AI as the world fears a recurrence of influenza pandemic at an even
bigger scale than the pandemic of 1918 which killed 50 million people worldwide. Improving
farm management both at the private level and at the public level is a centerpiece of the
strategy to avoid the recurrence of a pandemic. In October 2005, the German government
ordered poultry to be kept indoors (or in special shelters) for nearly two months to avoid
possible avian influenza infection from migratory birds (USDA, 2005). Once AI is detected
on a farm, the flock is usually culled. The United Kingdom culled 15,300 birds following the
AI type H5N1 outbreak in Redgrave and Knettishall in November, 2007 (OIE, 2008b).
While AI is perhaps one of the most feared infections, other diseases that affect farm
animals such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) commonly known as mad cow
disease, and Aphtae epizooticae or foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can also have devastating
effects on farmers and economies, especially those that rely heavily on exports of cattle and
poultry products. This is one of the reasons most countries employ stringent restrictions
on imports of uncooked farm products by tourists, as any international traveler knows. If
an infection among farm birds or animals is reported in a country, its exports of related
meat products are often subjected to a blanket ban by other countries. The restrictions are
imposed because of fear of transmission of disease to farm and nonfarm animals as well as
humans.
When livestock is destroyed following an infection, compensation is often paid to the
affected farmers. It is said that without compensation farmers may have little incentive to
report an outbreak to authorities. It is also argued that since farmers have little control over
the contracting of the initial infection, it is unfair to punish them. As a result, we find that
in most cases of AI infections, farmers are indeed compensated. Compensation is often paid
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for culled birds at varying rates in different countries, though formal examination of optimal
compensation levels is limited (World Bank, 2006).
However, it is not clear a priori why only compensation can provide the right incen-
tives for the farmers. In fact, in the case of AI at the Bernard Mathew’s Turkey farm in
Suffolk, England, the government was criticized for compensating the farm and not imposing
any penalties (Elliott, 2007). The farmers may have little control over the initial contracting
of the disease, but the subsequent spread can to a large extent depend on the actions of
the farmers. Efforts to detect and report AI in bird flocks have special significance for free-
range farming that may allow poultry to come in contact with migratory birds (USGS, 2006;
USDA, 2008). Vigilance and early reporting of any infections by farmers can be incentivized
through an appropriately designed scheme of fines and/or compensation.
What type of policies should a government follow to induce effective farm behavior
in the face of a potential invasion by an infectious disease? The question is at the heart of
the present paper. We develop an optimizing model of a farm when there is an exogenous
probability that a disease is introduced on the farm. Once the disease invasion takes place,
its rate of spread within the farm depends on the size of the farm (livestock), and the
level of efforts by the farmer. Although for the brevity of exposition, we shall refer to the
infection as AI, the analysis may also apply to other farm diseases such as BSE and FMD.
We consider two instruments for inducing the farmer to behave as a ‘social planner’ would
want the farmer to. The instruments are a fine proportional to the incidence of infection
on the farm and a compensation scheme proportional to the total cost of the farmer. We
analyze how the farmer’s behavior is affected by these instruments. We derive optimal levels
for the instruments under two scenarios — short-run and long-run — depending on whether
the size of the farm is exogenous or endogenous. We show that the fine is superior as an
instrument when farm size is endogenous, but the two instruments are equivalent when farm
size is exogenous.
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The final aspect of our analysis deals with the effects of free-range farming. This
type of farming increases the potential for livestock exposure to disease vectors. On the
other hand, subsequent spread of infection may be slow due to lower stocking density under
free-range farming compared with more intensive forms of farming.1 We examine how the
farmer’s behavior and the optimal instrument level is affected by the degree of free-ranging.
The literature on the economics of avian influenza has only recently started to emerge.
Part of the literature has modeled farmer behavior, and part of it has focused on estimating
the impacts of potential AI outbreaks. Elbakidze (2008) presents an epidemiological model
for minimizing the cost from an avian influenza outbreak by controlling contact rates and the
length of symptomatic and asymptomatic periods. The model is solved numerically to find
cost minimizing policies under different parameter choices. Public versus private incentives to
manage outbreaks are not modeled. Beach et al. (2007) model farmer behavior when facing
a potential AI outbreak. They consider the impact of government provided compensation for
culled birds on the private control measures by profit-maximizing farmers, and propose data
and analyses for generating information to guide public policy for AI prevention. Optimal
level of compensation or other instruments for public welfare-maximization is not derived.
Paarlberg et al. (2007) empirically estimate the economic impacts of potential AI outbreaks
in the United States under different regionalization scenarios. Brown et al. (2007) use the
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) model to estimate the impact of
AI outbreaks on different US agricultural sectors. There is also substantial literature on
other forms of farm infections, for example, Rich and Winter-Nelson (2007), Pendell et al.
(2007), and Zhao et al. (2006), Dent et al. (2002) on FMD, Chi et al. (2002), Fox et al.
(2005), Dnes (1996), and Mainland and Ashworth (1992), on BSE, and Bicknell et al. (1999)
on farm infection in general, among many other important contributions.
The present paper distinguishes itself from the above literature in a number of ways.
First, our focus is on public policy to induce appropriate farm behavior. Second, we model
1In the European Union, free-range bird density is set at 2,500 birds per hectare.
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and compare two instruments to motivate optimal behavior by farmers. Third, we examine
both short-run and long-run scenarios. Finally, we examine how optimal farm responses and
public policy are affected by the degree of free ranging.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The following section (section 2) sets up the
theoretical framework and analyzes the short-run and long-run scenarios in subsection 2.1
and 2.2. Section 3 provides concluding remarks.
2 The theoretical framework
We consider a representative farm facing a competitive market for its product. The product
could be any animal, but for the sake of exposition we shall call it birds. Farming practice
is modeled parametrically by the degree of free-ranging denoted by θ.2 Since free-rage farm
products typically attract a higher market price, we assume that the price p is an increasing
function of θ:
p(θ) = θρ, ρ > 0. (1)
The farm has a stock of n birds which shall be treated both exogenously and endoge-
nously in the analyses that follow. There is a probability φ that a bird in the farm catches
an infection from an invading bird. This probability is assumed to be an increasing function
of the degree of free-ranging θ. In particular,
φ(θ) = θψ, 1 > ψ > 0. (2)
Since free-range farming allows birds to move around more freely, the probability of initial
infection is larger in a farm with a higher degree of free-ranging. However, once the infection
takes place, its rate of spread among other birds on the farm is likely to be smaller on a farm
that allows more free-ranging due to lower bird density. We also assume that the farmer
makes an effort e to detect and limit the spread of the infection within the farm by, for
2There can be many levels of free-ranging depending on, for example, the amount of time the animals are
allowed to roam around.
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example, keeping an eye on the health of the birds. Total number of infected birds s is
assumed to be an increasing function of n, but decreasing in e and θ:
s(n, e, θ) = nαe−βθ−γ, α > 1, β > 0, γ > 0. (3)
The assumption that α > 1 captures the fact that the disease is infectious, and the proportion
infected (s/n), ceteris paribus, increases with n.
The total cost of production, c, (including that of effort e) is assumed to be:
c(n, e, θ) = nδeθλ, δ > 1,  > 1, λ > 1, (4)
where the assumptions that the parameters are greater than unity is consistent with the
standard assumption of convex cost functions. In addition to these costs, there are policy
induced costs (and benefits). We consider two policy instruments for the government. When
an infection is found on a farm, the government destroys the bird stock on the farm, and
a rebate, y, is paid to the farm as a proportion of its total costs. In addition, a fine f is
imposed on the farm per infected bird found on the farm. The expected net profit of the
farm pi is then
pi(n, e, θ, f, y) = (1− φ(θ))p(θ)n− c(n, e, θ)(1− yφ(θ))− fs(n, e, θ)φ(θ). (5)
The first term is expected revenue from the sale of birds. The second term is the expected
production cost, net of any rebate received. The final terms is the total expected fine.
We consider a two stage game. In stage two, the farmer makes profit-maximizing
choices for given fine and compensation levels. In stage one, the government decides on the
optimal levels of the policy instrument f and y taking into account the farmer’s reaction
functions. In the following two subsections, we consider two cases depending on whether n
is endogenous (long-run) or exogenous (short-run).
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2.1 The case of endogenous n
We start with the case where n is endogenous, and the farm’s optimization problem is
to maximize (5) with respect to n and e. Using (1)-(4), the first order profit-maximizing
conditions are:3
pin =
∂pi
∂n
= 0 (6)
⇒ θρ (1− θψ) = en−1+δδθλ(1− yθψ) + e−βn−1+αfαθ−γ+ψ (7)
pie =
∂pi
∂e
= 0 (8)
⇒ e−1−βnαfβθ−γ+ψ = e−1+nδθλ(1− yθψ). (9)
The left hand side of (7) is the expected marginal benefit of expanding the size of the
farm. The first term on the right hand side of (7) is the marginal production cost and the
second term is the marginal increase in fine due to expected increase in infections associated
with increasing farm size. The left hand side of (9) is the marginal benefits of effort in terms
of reduced expected infections and thus fines; the right hand side represents the marginal
cost of effort.
Solving (7) and (9) simultaneously, the resulting optimal n and e are:
n∗(θ, f, r) =
[
An f
− θ(γ−βλ+(β+)ρ)
(−1 + θ−ψ)(β+) (−y + θ−ψ)−β] 1σ (10)
e∗(θ, f, r) =
[
Ae f
(−1+δ) θ(γ−γδ+λ−αλ+(α−δ)ρ)
(−1 + θ−ψ)(α−δ) (−y + θ−ψ)−(α−1)] 1σ , (11)
3 The second order conditions, evaluated at the optimum, are satisfied.
pinn = −e−βfn−2+α(−1 + α)αθ−γ+ψ − en−2+δ(−1 + δ)δθλ
(
1− yθψ) < 0,
piee = −e−2−βfnα(1 + β)βθ−γ+ψ − e−2+nδ(−1 + )θλ
(
1− yθψ) < 0,
[pinnpiee − (pine)2] = e−2(1+β)f2n−2+2αβ(β(−1 + δ) + (−1 + α))(βδ + α)θ−2γ+2ψ > 0.
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where4
σ = β(−1 + δ) + (−1 + α) > 0,
An = β
β  (βδ + α)(β+) > 0,
Ae = β
(−1+α) (1−δ) (βδ + α)(−α+δ) > 0.
From (10) and (11), we obtain the following results.
Lemma 1 When n is endogenous,
(i) the optimal value of n decreases with f , but increases with y,
(ii) the optimal value of e increases with f or y,
(iii) when the government uses only one instrument, viz., a fine per infected animal, an
increase in θ (a) reduces the optimal size of the firm n if λ > (γ + (β + )ρ + ψβ)/β, and
(b) reduces optimal effort level if 0 ≤ α− δ ≤ (α− 1)(λ− ψ) + γ(δ − 1).
The marginal cost (right hand side of (7)) of increasing the bird stock or the size of
the farm is increasing in f and decreasing in y, while the marginal benefit (left hand side
of (7)) does not depend on either. Therefore, when f increases or y decreases, the optimal
value of n decreases. The marginal cost (right hand side of (9)) of increasing the effort level
does not depend on f , and is decreasing in y, while the marginal benefit (L.H.S. of (9)) is
increasing in f and does not depend on y. Thus, when either f or y increases, the optimal
value of e increases. A change in the value of θ affects all components of marginal benefits
and costs in both first order conditions above. In particular, an increase in θ increases the
marginal costs of an additional bird (the first term on the of right hand side of (7)) and the
magnitude of this effect depends on the size of the parameter λ. If λ is sufficiently high,
this effect dominates all other effects and an increase in θ reduces the optimal value of n.
An increase in θ has two opposing effects on the marginal cost of efforts; the magnitude
4Note that probability φ = θψ ∈ [0, 1], and y ≤ 1 otherwise (5) is monotonic increasing in e. Therefore,
−y + θ−ψ > 0 and −1 + θ−ψ > 0.
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on the increase (decrease) in marginal costs depends on the size of λ (ψ), and if λ − ψ is
sufficiently large, the net effect on the marginal costs of efforts is not only positive but it also
dominates all other effects, reducing the optimal value of e. Let pi(n∗, e∗, f, y, r) represent
the maximized farm profit (for given f, y).
In the first stage of the game, the government chooses the fine, f , and rebate, y,in
order to maximize expected social welfare W given by
W = CS + pi(n∗, e∗, f, y, r)− φ(θ)H(s(n∗, e∗, θ)) + φ(θ)[fs(n∗, e∗, θ)− yc(n∗, e∗, θ)], (12)
where H(s) represents the extent of public health externality associated with the epidemic,
CS is consumers’ surplus, and the last term is the net revenue for the government. We
assume that
H(s) = sη, η > 1. (13)
We assume that there is a sufficient number of domestic farmers to supply the market
or the necessary demand is met with imports, so there is no disruption to consumption in
the case of a bird flu outbreak. Therefore, consumers surplus is given by
CS =
1
2b
(D[θ])2 , (14)
where D[θ] = a− bp[θ], a, b > 0. (15)
Substituting (10) and (11) in (12), the first order conditions for the government’s
optimization problem are derived as:5
Wf =
∂W
∂f
= 0
⇒ ηβ β(η−1)σ  (βδ+α)ησ (β(−1 + δ) + α)(βδ + α) (βδ+α)(1−η)σ (1− θψ) (βδ+α)(η−1)σ
θ
(η−1)[γ+β(ψ−λ)+(α+βδ)(ρ−ψ)]
σ
(
1− yθψ) (α−1)+β(δ−η)σ (16)
+ f
βη(δ−1)+(−1+αη)
σ 
α+β(−1+δ+η)
σ
[
β − (βδ + α) (1− yθψ)] = 0.
5It can be verified that the second order conditions, evaluated at the optimal, are satisfied. Since the
expressions are very large, they are omitted here for the sake of brevity.
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Wy =
∂W
∂y
= 0
⇒ −ηβ β(η−1)σ  (βη(δ−1)+(αη−1)σ (βδ + α) (βδ+α)(1−η)σ
θ
(η−1)[γ+β(ψ−λ)+(α+βδ)(ρ−ψ)]
σ
(
1− θψ) (βδ+α)(η−1)σ (1− yθψ)β(1−η)σ (17)
− f βη(δ−1)+(−1+αη)σ
(
[βδ + (−1 + α)] (1− yθψ)−1 − (βδ + α)) = 0.
Since an increase in f reduces the optimal value of n and increases that of e, it reduces
the number of infections s and thus the disutility from public health hazard. A lower level
of n and e also reduces production costs and thus rebate payments to the farmers. These
are marginal benefits of an increase in f . An increase in f reduces the revenue received per
unit fine, and this is the marginal social cost of an increase in f – the deadweight loss from
taxation. These marginal benefits and costs are equalized in (16). The marginal effects of
an increase in y on social welfare given in (17) can be similarly explained.
Simultaneously solving (16) and (17), we get the optimal values of the two policy
instruments as:
f = β
β(−1+η)
β(−1+δ)η+(−1+αη) 
(β(−1+δ)+α)(−1+η)
β(−1+δ)η+(−1+αη) (βδ + α)−
(βδ+α)(−1+η)
β(−1+δ)η+(−1+αη) (18)
η
β(−1+δ)+(−1+α)
β(−1+δ)η+(−1+αη) θ
(η−1)[γ+β(ψ−λ)+(α+βδ)(ρ−ψ)]
β(−1+δ)η+(−1+αη)
(
1− θψ) (βδ+α)(−1+η)β(−1+δ)η+(−1+αη)
y = 0. (19)
The above characterization of the optimal policy instruments indiactes that the fine
is a more appropriate measure to induce better farming practice than the rebate. The reason
for this result is that while an increase in f reduces n and increases e and thus the level of
potential infections, s, an increase in the level of the rebate y, while also increasing e, in fact
increases the size of the bird stock n and thus has an opposite effect on potential infections
s, as can be seen by taking appropriate derivatives of (10) and (11).
Proposition 1 A fine per infection is a superior instrument to a rebate on costs for dealing
with a potential bird flu epidemic.
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From (18), we also obtain the following results:
Proposition 2 When the size of the firm is endogenous, an increase in the degree of free
ranging reduces the optimal level of the fine if the cost of the firm is sufficiently sensitive to
the degree of free ranging, i.e., the value of λ is sufficiently high. The optimal value of y
remains unchanged.
By 1, when the value of λ is high, an increase in θ decreases the optimal size of the
farm, n∗, and the effort level, e∗, decreasing the net marginal benefit of increasing f .
Finally, we want to determine the total effect of θ on the optimal level of n and e.
For this, note that
dn
dθ
=
∂n
∂θ
+
∂n
∂f
(+)
· df
dθ
+
∂n
∂y
· dy
dθ
(0)
, (20)
de
dθ
=
∂e
∂θ
+
∂e
∂f
(+)
· df
dθ
+
∂e
∂y
· dy
dθ
(0)
. (21)
The first terms on the right hand sides of (20) and (21) give the direct effects of an
increase in θ. The second terms give the indirect effects via induced changes in the optimal
levels of the policy instruments. Since the optimal value of y is always zero, the third terms
on the right hand sides of (20) and (21) disappear. Then combining lemma 1 and proposition
2, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in θ (a) reduces the optimal value of n (taking into account the
indirect effect via changes in government policies) if λ is sufficiently large, and (b) reduces
the optimal effort level e (taking into account the indirect effect via changes in government
policies) if 0 ≤ α− δ ≤ (α− 1)(λ− ψ) + γ(δ − 1) .
Note that if λ is sufficiently large, the indirect effect (via changes in optimal policies)
of an increase in the degree of free-ranging on the size of the farm and the effort level are
both negative.
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2.2 The case of exogenous n
In the preceding subsection we assumed that the farm optimally chooses the size of of the
bird stock n. However, it may not be possible — at least in the short run — for a farm to
do so. In this section therefore we consider n to be an exogenous parameter.
Since n is exogenous, here we ignore equation (7) (first-order condition for n) and
from (9) the optimal solution for e is solved as:6
e∗∗[θ, f, r] =
(
fβ
n−α+δθγ+λ (−y + θ−ψ)
) 1
β+
(22)
From (22), we obtain the following results.
Lemma 2 When n is exogenous, we have:
(i) An increase in n raises the optimal value of e if and only if α > δ,
(ii) An increase in f or y unambiguously raises the optimal value of e,
(iii) ∂e∗∗/∂θ < 0 ⇐⇒ (γ + λ)(1− yφψ) > ψ.
The results with respect to f and y can be explained as in proposition 2. The effect
of n on the optimal level of e can be explained as follows. An increase in n raises both
the marginal benefits and marginal costs of efforts, and the magnitudes of the two depend
respectively on the size of the parameters α and δ (see (9). Thus, an increase in n increases
the optimal effeort level if and only if α > δ.
Turning to optimal policies, the expression for social welfare W is the same as in (12)
with n∗ replaced by the exogenous value of n. Maximizing welfare with respect to the two
6The second order condition, evaluated at the optimum, is satisfied since
e2 · vee = − e−βfnαβ(1 + β)θ−γ+ψ − enδ(−1 + )θλ
(
1− yθψ) < 0.
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instruments f and y gives us:7
Wf =
∂W
∂f
= 0 ⇒
f
+βη
β+ n
βδ+α
β+ β
+βη
β+ θ
γη+βλ+βηψ
β+ = ηβn
(βδ+α)η
β+ 
+βη
β+ θ
γ+βηλ+βψ
β+
(
1− yθψ) +βηβ+ (23)
Wy =
∂W
∂y
= 0 ⇒
f
+βη
β+ n
βδ+α
β+ β
+βη
β+ θ
γη+βλ+βηψ
β+ = ηβn
(βδ+α)η
β+ 
+βη
β+ θ
γ+βηλ+βψ
β+
(
1− yθψ) +βηβ+ (24)
The right hand sides of (24) and (24) give the marginal benefits of the policy instru-
ments (via reductions in public health hazards) and the left hand sides are the marginal
costs associated with changes in government revenues.
From (23) and (24) are not independent equations, and therefore unique values of both
cannot be endogenously determined. From the equation below, we can either determine the
optimal value of f for a given value of y or determine the optimal value of y for given value
of f .
f = n
(βδ+α)(−1+η)
+βη β−1+
β+
+βη 
β(−1+η)
+βη η
β+
+βη θ−
(−1+η)(γ+β(−λ+ψ))
+βη
(
1− yθψ) . (25)
The above result can be stated formally as
Proposition 4 When n is exogenous, the two instruments f and y are equivalent.
When n is endogenous, the instrument f is superior to y (proposition 1) since an
increase in y (but not f) increases n and thus exposing the society to more potential pub-
7The second order conditions are satisfied since.
(β + )2 Wff = −f−2−
βη
β+ β1−
βη
β+ −

β+ θ−
γ(1+η)−ψ+βηψ
β+
(
1− yθψ)− β+ n (βδ+α)ηβ+  +βηβ+ η(+ βη)
θ
γ+βηλ+βψ
β+
(
1− yθψ) +βηβ+ < 0,
(β + )2 Wyy = −f−
βη
β+ β−
βη
β+ −

β+ θ−
γ(1+η)+(−3+β(−2+η))ψ
β+
(
1− yθψ)−3+ ββ+
f
+βη
β+ n
βδ+α
β+ β
+βη
β+ (βη + )θ
γη+βλ+βηψ
β+ < 0.
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lic health hazards. Here, since n is exogenous this negative property of the instrument y
disappears and both instruments become equivalent.
In particular, when y = 0 the optimal value of f is given by
f = n
(βδ+α)(−1+η)
+βη β−1+
β+
+βη 
β(−1+η)
+βη η
β+
+βη θ−
(−1+η)(γ+β(−λ+ψ))
+βη . (26)
Since 1 > ψ > 0 and λ > 1, from (26), the following result follows
Proposition 5 When the government uses only one instrument, viz., a fine per infected
animal, and the the size of the firm n is exogenous, we have the following results:
(i) An increase in n unambiguously increases the optimal value of the fine, and
(ii) An increase in the degree of free-ranging unambiguously decreases the optimal level of
fine.
An increase in n increases both the marginal costs and benefits of f , but the magnitude
of the gain in benefits is larger than that in costs, raising the optimal value of f . A rise
in the value of θ also increases both the marginal costs and benefits of f , but this time the
magnitude of the gain in costs is larger than that in benefits, lowering the optimal value of
f .
Finally, we want to determine the total effect of θ and n on the optimal level of e,
assuming y = 0. For this note that
de
dθ
=
∂e
∂θ
+
∂e
∂f
(+)
· df
dθ
(−)
, (27)
de
dn
=
∂e
∂n
+
∂e
∂f
(+)
· df
dn
(+)
. (28)
The first terms on the right hand sides of (27) and (28) show the direct effects of changes in
θ and n respectively. The second terms show the indirect effects via induced changes in the
optimal level of f .
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When y = 0, combining lemma 2 and proposition 5, we derive the following results.
Proposition 6 When y = 0, (a) an increase in the value of θ decreases the optimal level of
efforts (taking into effect the indirect effect via a change in policy) if (γ + λ)(1− yφψ) > ψ,
and (b) an increase in the size of the firm increases the optimal level of efforts if α > δ.
Note that while the indirect effect of a change in θ on e is negative, that of a change
in n on e is positive. This is because while an increase in θ reduces the optimal value of f ,
a rise in n does just the opposite.
3 Conclusion
The fear of a possible bird flu pandemic has forced many governments and international
institutions such as the World Health Organization to take measures to minimize the threat
of possible public health disaster in the future. Over the past few years, many sporadic
instances of this invasive influenza have been observed in different parts of the world among
poultry birds and occaisonally among humans in close contact with infected poultry. In
each case, the relevant governments, sometimes with the help of the WHO, acted swiftly
culling large numbers of infected and potentially infected birds. What sort of policies should
governments have toward individual farms? Should they be fined if infections are found in
their farms or should they be compensated for the loss of their stock of poultry? Should
the policy be dependent on the degree of free-ranging of the farms? These are some of the
questions that we address in this paper.
We develop an optimizing model of a poultry farm with a given degree of free-ranging.
There is an exogenous probability that an infectious disease invades the farm. Once the
invasion takes place, its rate of spread within the farm depends on the size of the farm (bird
stock), the level of surveillance and prevention effort by the farmer, and on the degree of
free-ranging in the farm. Once an infection is detected, the entire stock is destroyed, and
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the farm receives a cost rebate from and pays a fine per sick bird to the government. Within
this framework, we examine the optimal response of the farm and of the government and
analyze how these responses are affected by the degree of free-ranging in the farm.
We consider two scenarios depending on whether the perspectives of the problem is
short-run or long-run. In the short-run, the size of the farm is assumed to be exogenous, but
in the long-run it is optimally chosen by the farmer. We find that both the nature of optimal
policy and its responsiveness to farming practices are quite different in the two scenarios.
In the short-run, a fine per infected animal and a rebate on costs are equivalent and either
instrument can be used to induce optimal behavior by the farmers. In the long-run, a fine
is superior to rebate as a policy instrument.
In the short-run, we find that the farmer chooses to exert more effort in surveillance
and prevention of disease when compensation is increased. Similar impact is seen for an
increase in fine as well. The optimal effort level can increase or decrease with farm size. If
the elasticity of sick population to farm size is greater than the elasticity of farm cost to
farm size, then an increase in farm size causes an increase in effort. The effort level decreases
with the degree of free-ranging if the elasticity of cost to the degree of free-ranging is high
and the elasticity of sick population to the degree of free-ranging is low. In addition, the
optimal fine increases with farm size and decreases with the degree of free-ranging.
In the long-run, when the farmer can choose farm size or bird stock, we find that a
larger bird stock is chosen when compensation is increased or fine is decreased. The optimal
effort level increases with an increase in compensation or fine. The farm size decreases, the
effort level increases, and the optimal fine decreases with the degree of free-ranging if the
elasticity of cost to the degree of free-ranging is high. The results indicate that small free-
range farms, particularly those with cost sensitivity to free-ranging, would require smaller
fines in case of an outbreak compared with larger and traditional farms.
Further work is needed in a number of directions. The public impact of an avian
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influenza or other similar outbreak may consist of multiple components, including not only
the health impact considered in this paper, but also temporary or permanent changes in food
consumption patterns and changes in farmland usage driven by profitability. Management of
these impacts in a unified framework needs to be examined. In addition, while surveillance
and detection efforts help identify an outbreak when a relatively small number of birds have
been infected, prevention efforts such as limiting inter-farm livestock contact may also help
reduce the probability of a disease outbreak on the farm. A farmer can also reduce the
probability of a disease outbreak on the farm by choosing the degree of free-ranging. Such
efforts by the farmer can be allowed by extending the model in this paper. Finally, the
government can use advertising and outreach programs to educate farmers in better disease
detection and prevention practices. This would result in improved effectiveness of efforts by
farmers, decreasing the marginal cost of reducing expected infections.
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